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Summary: The Cause/Consequence Diagram Method 
as a Basis for Quantitative Accident Analysis 
The purpose of this paper is the presentation of a graphical method 
for clearing up relevant accidents in complex nuclear installations. 
Generally expressed the method is a proposal for an expedient presenta-
tion of the logical connections between a "spectrum" of accident causes 
and a "spectrum" of relevant consequences, e.g. expressed in terms of 
fission products released to the population. Besides being a tool used 
in connection with clearing up these consequences the method serves as 
a basis from which the probability of occurrence of the individual 
consequences may be evaluated. 
Presented are the logical connections between essential foreseeable 
failure causes, failure courses and their consequences in cases where 
they are terminated as intended, and not terminated as intended. As an 
accident is the result of a coincidence of events and/or failures, fault 
trees with the logical "AND" and "OR" gates are used in such a way that 
the following relevant items are stated: 
1. Relevant failure causes (including causes of common mode 
failures and human failures). 
2. Logical connections between events and conditions. 
3« Time delays in the single failure courses where these delays 
are significant. 
k. Relevant consequences. 
Together with the concept a "critical event", which for exampl" aay 
often be described as a transgression of the safety limit of a vital 
reactor parameter, the main principle of the method is that two fault 
tree methods are used in a combined way to determine the logical connec-
tions between the causes of the critical event and the possible conse-
quences of it. 
The "cause diagram" (cause searching) is the well-known fault tree 
where the construction of the tree begins with the definition of the "top" 
undesired event (the critical event). The causes are then indicated and 
connected with the top event by means of a logic gate, and the procedure 
is repeated for each of the causes until all events have been fully 
developed. 
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The "consequence diagram" (consequence searching) is =r. event-
sequential diagram showing the alternative courses the critica? event 
might lead to if or? or more systems with accident-anticipating/limiting 
effect do not function as intended. Cause diagrams, normally evaluated 
for the worst functional failure of these systems, are coupled to the 
consequence diagram. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the solution of the problems in connection with the use of a 
more quantitative approach at the safety assessment of nuclear power 
plants it is necessary that expedient tools for accident analysis should 
be available and employed during the design phase as well as at the final 
safety assessment of the plant. Tools that in a systematic way can 
handle large systems and be helpful at the display of the factors that 
are of vital importance for the safety. 
The purpose of thii ^aper is the presentation of a proposal for a 
graphical accident analysis method which is based on the use of a combi-
nation of already existing graphical tools for accident analysis. 
1. FORMULATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO THE GRAPHICAL TOOL 
USED IN CONNECTION WITH QUANTITATIVE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
For a more quantitative approach to be carried out at the safety 
assessment of a nuclear power station it is necessary to have a method-
ology that can be used in connection with analysis of accidents in 
large complex systems. A methodology which can partly elucidate the 
ability of the plant to meet and subdue accident situations and which 
can partly determine a representative spectrum of accidents that, if 
they occur, will have serious radiological consequences for the personnel 
and the population. This spectrum of accidents can subsequently be takes 
as a starting point for assessment of the "safety degree" of the plant, 
and the question whether this is adequate or not has to be answered. 
The quantitative approach together with some safety criteria lead to an 
objective answer to this question (ref. 1). 
One of the necessary conditions for a realistic quantitative analysis 
is, however, that it is possible to give a sufficiently broad description 
and preeentation of the logical connections between a "spectrum" of 
accident causes and a "spectrum" of relevant accident consequences, the 
latter for instance expressed in terms of quantitative specifications of 
fission products released to the surrounding«;. 
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A given accident can be said to be characterized by a "cause", a 
sequence of events where the time between the occurrence of the single 
events can be an important parameter, and finally by the consequences 
of the accident. A graphical method for clearing up relevant accidents 
should therefore be worked out as a tool that can be used fet the de-
termination of the alternative possible courses and consequences that 
the (postulated) "cause" might lead to if one or more of the accident-
anticipating/limiting provisions fail. Furthermore, the method should 
provide a basis for determination of the probabilities of the single 
consequences. 
As to the regarded failure or event, called the "cause" of the 
accident, some problems concerning the cause specification might arise. 
Is it for instance expedient in some cases to define the "cause" as a 
transgression of the "safe-y limit" of a vital reactor parameter and in 
other cases as a critical functional failure in an important system. 
In the latter case, on which "level" should it then be chosen, on a 
"sub-system level", or a "component level"? In short, the question 
is: What is the most expedient starting point of an accident analysis? 
It is, of course, not possible a priori directly to define neither 
the possible relevant consequences nor the causes which might lead to 
these. Starting an analysis by an arbitrary choice of a cause such as 
an accidental closure of a valve, or a certain temperature regulator 
failure, and then trying to find out what can happen, seems to be both 
overwhelmingly difficult and unexpedient. 
In a graph connecting all relevant causes and consequences it may 
be found that the paths from several independent causes to their conse-
quences have a "common node" in the form of a certain event beyond which 
the graphs are indentical. This means that it may be more expedient as 
a starting point to postulate a certain event, related to the node, that 
may be a result of many independent causes, and that calls for actions 
i'rom the same accident-anticipating/limiting systems. This event may b'e 
considered as a "critical event" from which a consequence-searching as 
well as a cause-searching analysis may be performed. 
Summing up, this means that by means of the graphical tool the 
logical connections between essential foreseeable failure causes, failure 
courses and their consequences in cases that are terminated es intended, 
and not terminated as intended, should be presented in such a way that 
the following relevant items are stated: 
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1. Relevant failure causes (including causes of common mode 
failures and human failures). 
2. Logical connections between events and conditions. 
3. Time delays in the single failure courses where these delays 
are significant. 
km Relevant consequences. 
2. METHODS FOR CLEARING-UP AND PRESENTATION OF ACCIDENTS 
As an accident is the result of a coincidence of events and/or 
failures, fault trees with the logic AND and OR gates are used. The 
diagram methods hitherto used can on the whole be divided into two main 
groups that may be called: 
1. The cause diagram method (cause searching). 
2. The consequence diagram method (consequence searching). 
2.1. The Cause Diagram Method 
The cause diagram is an event logic diagram relating events and 
conditions to a particular undesired event which might be for instance 
a relevant system failure, see fig. 1. Only events that might contribute 
to the undesired event are considered. 
The method is characterized by the following points: 
1. The construction of the diagram begins with a precise defini-
tion of the "top" undesired event, i.e. the system failure of 
interest. 
2. The tree is then developed downwards, i.e. the causes of the 
"top" event are connected with this by means of a logic gate, 
and the procedure is repeated for each of the causes and the 
causes of the causes until all events have been fully developed. 
The tree is considered fully developed when all independent 
causes, the basic input events, have been identified. 
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3« In principle the cause diagram or certain especially important 
parts of it can be developed down to independent failures of 
such components as bolts, relays, transistors, etc., but nor-
mally one stops at a higher level where the components comprise 
pumps, valves, measuring channels,etc. Occasionally also uub-
rysteras or equipment failures are used as basic input events 
if they are independent of all other basic input events. 
k. At each gate used in the diagram the input events must always 
be both necessary and sufficient, in the context of the gate, 
to produce the output event, otherwise the diagram will not 
be valid for probability analysis. 
5- Through the uae of logic gates the cause diagram is very suit-
able for revealing single failures as well as combinations of 
failures which might lead to the undesired event, and the pur-
pose is to bring to light not only "hardware" failures, but 
also "software" causes such as human failures. 
Generally, at the development of a cause diagram, special attention 
should be directed towards identification of common mode failures, i.e. 
simultaneous failures of two or more functionally independent system 
parts from a common cause. 
When redundant functional units are used, the probability that all, 
or nearly all, fail because of random internal faults may be made ex-
tremely small if all failures of the units are independent. In practice 
a system with so-called redundant units may, however, contain a not 
recognized and accepted common element, and a failure of this might cause 
failure of the entire system, i.e. a common mode failure (the design and 
analysis may be incomplete, and an unknown or undetected causal relation 
exists between failures that are hypothesized as independent or even in-
credible). Common mode failures of this kind may especially in systems 
with accident-anticipating/limiting intervention function often remain 
unrevealed until a thorough test of the system function is carried out. 
A cause diagram analysis may be hoped to reveal at least some of the 
causes of such failures and by this bring about a redesign. If the 
failure possibility is accepted, however, the analysis may help at an 
assessment or improvement of the test and maintenance procedures. 
The worst category of common mode failures may arise, howeverr under 
accident conditions where the performance of systems with accident-
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anticipating/limiting intervention function is of great importance. A 
functional failure of a normal operation system may initiate the need 
for reactor protection. If the same circumstances can also induce failure 
of the instrumentation that was provided to protect against the failure, 
a potentially hazardous situation exists. Similar, or particularly iden-
tical, functional units are susceptible to such common mode failures, and 
it is not evident that the probability of all of the units failing as the 
result of a single external or "environmental" event is acceptably small. 
The environmental factors (external causative conditions) that have 
in practice been the cause of common mode failures may be divided into the 
following categories (see ref. 2 in which examples ar^ presented): 
1. Change in characteristics of the system being protected (e.g. 
long term temperature changes). 
2. Unrecognized dependence on a common element. 
3> Disability caused by the accident being guarded against. 
4. Human error. 
The symbols used in connection with development of a cause diagram 
should in a systematic way help the analyst to direct the attention towards 
an identification of all the possible causes that may lead to a regarded 
functionpl syet em/equipment/component failure. Particularly to direct the 
attention towards identification of common mode failures an expedient 
failure classification, that may be applied to any regarded "unit level", 
would in this respect be valuable. 
Symbols presented in ref. 3 have been adopted, see fig. 2. Of logic 
gates only the AND and the OR gates are used. To classify the failure 
modes of a functional unit these are categorized as either "primary", 
"secondary", or "input". The OR gate (fig. 2) means that failure in just 
one of these categories is sufficient to make the output event occur. 
Primary failure occurs under normal operation conditions and may be brought 
about by inadequate design, a defect or deterioration in service. The 
symbol is a circle (a termination symbol). 
Secondary failure occurs when the object is subjected to unintended in-
fluence from ?ther structurally and operationally separated systems/ 
equipment/componenta in which failures have occurred (damage caused for 
instance by a crane, by missiles from exploded components, by temperature, 
pressure, vibration, humidity, or radiation influences during accident 
conditions). The symbol is a diamond (a termination symbol). 
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Input failure occurs when the functional unit is directed to fail, either 
by the imposition of excessive process conditions (out of control), 
mechanical loads, false signals (including also noise signals), false 
directions from operator/personnel (e.g. wrong set point - or trip level -
setting, etc.), or loss of power supply in those cases where this is also 
a supply to other functional units. The symbol is a rectangle, which 
indicates events or conditions which might be further developed. 
A common mode failure may be either a secondary failure or an input 
failure. 
In fig. 3 a cause diagram is developed for a simple pump stand-by 
system with manual switch-over to the stand-by unit P2 if loss of the 
normal "Pl-flow" occurs. Loss of the Pl-flow should be recognized by the 
operator by reading either the pressure transducer Dl or the dif. pressure 
transducer D2. It is assumed that both motor pumps ure supplied from a 
common guaranteed supply, whereas the motor-driven valves VI and V2 are 
supplied from independent sources. 
The undesired event is defined as "total loss of pump flow", and the 
diagram provides a basis for determination of the probability that the 
undesired event will occur at least once during a certain operating time, 
T. 
Generally special attention should be directed towards identification 
of common mode failures. In the simple example mentioned loss of the 
guaranteed supply can be regarded as the cause of a common mode failure which, 
as shown in fig. 3, should be explicitly shown (loss of the electric supply for 
VI for instance can be regarded as belonging to a primary failure category). 
2.2. The Consequence Diagram Method 
The other graphical method, the consequence diagram method, is a 
tool which can be used at the clearing-up of the logical connections 
between a postulated critical event and the possible relevant consequences 
of this event, see fig. 1. By use of expedient symbol« ths method can 
furthermore be helpful at the determination of the probability of the 
single consequences. The principle of the method is that the starting 
point is the definition of a critical event, and the objective is to de-
scribe how the accident might arise in spite of all precautions to prevent 
it. 
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The diagram in fig. ^  shows the important items that it is necessary 
to subject to an analysis by use of the consequence diagram method. Nor-
mally, for each regarded critical event a number of different possibili-
ties of release of fission products to personnel and population are present. 
To define all relevant consequences of this kind it is, however, necessary 
to make a quite general clearing-up of consequences, where all possible 
operator faults and faulty conditions in systems and/or equipment with 
accident-anticipating/limiting function are included in the analysis and 
combined with cases where operator and/or systems/equipment function cor-
rectly. A systematic clearing-up of these relationships will thus identify 
all possible results, inclusive of the cases where fission product release 
from the fuel does not result in radiological consequences, and the cases 
where fission product release does not occur at all. 
If the facts are included that a manual intervention may be more or 
less effective (the time that passes before the intervention is realized 
is for instance a factor which may have decisive influence), or that a 
system/equipment has failed, but is all the same more or less capable of 
carrying out the function intended, then a clearing-up might give a number 
of "continuous spectra" of relevant consequences (one may thus imagine 
that one or more areas within all degrees of fuel damage and fission pro-
duct release to the surroundings may occur). 
In practice, however, one has to base the logical diagrams on limi-
tations that are often stringent with the result that a "discrete spectrum" 
of consequences is a more apt designation. The consequence diagram method 
is then characterised by the use of the following methodology: 
1. The starting point is an examination of all relevant operating con-
ditions with reference to a definition of critical events, i.e. 
events which may separately lead to fission product release from the 
fuel (the condition for release to the surroundings), if one or more 
of the accident-anticipating/limiting provisions fail. A critical 
event may often be defined within a certain category of functional 
failures in the systems or equipment which are primarily necessary 
for establishment of the desired operation conditions. The limiting 
values of fuel temperature, coolant outlet temperature, power in 
relation to flow, etc., often dictate the working ranges of the sys-
tem functions. The limits of such "dictated" working ranges may 
therefore often constitute the fault criteria. 
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In some cases it may also be expedient to define the critical event 
as a transgression of the "safety limit" of a vital reactor parameter 
due to system function failures. 
2. For each critical event a logical clearing-up of connections between 
events and conditions is carried out in order to determine the 
possible alternative accident consequences. For each system or 
equipment with accident-anticipating/limiting function, only two 
states are normally taken into account. These states are 1) correct 
system functioning and 2) worst functional system failure (example: 
control rod trip - no control rod trip). 
In the same way a distinction is made between 1) correct manual 
intervention (i.e. intervention which carried out in accordance with 
established procedures gives an intended accident-anticipating or 
-limiting effect) and 2) no manual intervention* 
3. As was the case with the cause diagram method, different graphical 
symbols are used. Symbols which, if they are expedient, force the 
analyst at least qualitatively to follow up and present the possible 
sequences. When the complete qualitative diagram is present, the 
analyst is to quantify the consequences and their probability. The 
quantitative determination of the consequences, i.e. the fission 
products released to the surroundings, may for instance be based on 
mathematical model calculations of the possible energy transients. 
In so doing, the character and the extent of fuel damage, which make 
up the starting point for the further assessment, are determined. 
Graphical symbols that are very suitable for use in connection with 
the consequence diagram method have been proposed by Mr. 0. Knecht and 
Mr. H. Keil, see fef. 6. Among the proposed syabole, see fig. 5»(some of 
the symbols are in this paper slightly modified).especially t n e "delay" 
symbol should be noticed. By means of this the time parameter, which may 
often be an important factor at the determination of the consequences, is 
introduced. In the probability analysis the time that passes between 
important sequential events (the delay) is important as the knowledge of 
critical delays may often help the analyst to differentiate the different 
courses in the right way. 
In fig. 6 a consequence diagram for the critical event "drop of 
control rod" (BWR) is partly developed. 
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3. DISCUSSION 
The necessary basis for use of a more quantitative approach in con-
nection with the safety assessment of a nuclear power plant is a defini-
tion and presentation of the logical connections between a "spectrum of 
independent accident causes" and a "spectrum of relevart accident conse-
quences". 
On the question how the causes, which at worst could lead to fission 
product release from the fuel, are identified, one might be tempted to 
think *hat the cause diagram method (cause searching) alone would be the 
right method. That this is not correct can be seen when it is taken into 
consideration that the cause diagram method is based on a precise defini-
tion of an undesired event. Fuel damage constitutes an undesired event, 
but it would be impossible a priori to define the character and the extent 
of the damage which might occur. 
It seems, however, reasonable, when the problem is to define and 
connect the two spectra, to use a combination of the cause diagram and 
the consequence diagram methods. Among the symbols shown in fig. 5, the 
rcc+angular symbol with the mutually exclusive outputs "no" and "yes" 
is often in connection with the function of a system or an item of equip-
ment used to indicate the two states "functions correctly" and "does not 
function". As the "no" output represents a well-defined failure condition, 
it provides an expedient coupling point between the consequence diagram 
and the cause diagram of the system/equipment failure concerned. 
Often the causes of a critical event may be determined by means of 
the cause diagram method. In principle the input-output data of the total 
"combined diagram" of a certain critical event will by this method be as 
shown in fig. ?. 
The cause diagrams whose outputs are inputs to the consequence 
diagram may conveniently be divided into: 
1« Cause diagrams of functional failures in systems or equipment that 
are primarily necessary to establish the desired operation conditions 
(BWR: reactor vessel, control systems, main steam and feed water 
lines, main condenser, turbine/generator + grid, etc.). 
2* Cause diagrams of the normally "worst" functional failures in systems/ 
equipment with accident-anticipating/limiting function (automatic 
trip systems, emergency power supplies, emergency heat removal systems, 
clean-up systems, containment, etc.; if desired, certain control 
systems for normal operation may in some cases be included in this 
category). 
The structure of a cause/consequence diagram is shown in fig. 8. 
From the different kinds of symbols reference can be made to supporting 
information concerning operating and emergency instructions, test and 
maintenance procedures, component analysis, fault effect analysis, etc. 
As mentioned earlier a critical event is an event which may lead to 
fission product release from the fuel if one or more systems/equipment 
with accident-anticipating/limiting function fail. Each normal operating 
condition of the reactor should therefore be analysed for critical events 
which may lead to the following main categories of accidents: 
1. Reactivity accidents 
2. Loss of coolant 
3> Loss of coolant flow. 
For a given reactor condition and main category of accident the 
steps in an analysis may generally be as follows: 
1. Postulation of a critical event that may be a result of several 
independent causes, and that calls for actions from the same systems 
with accident-anticipating/limiting intervention function. The 
critical event may for instance be defined as a transgression of the 
safety limit of a vital reactor parameter due to several (hypothesizedly) 
independent system/sub-system/component failures. 
2. Definition of other critical events on the basis of the cause/conse-
quence diagram for the postulated critical event. 
a) The cause/consequence diagram of the postulated critical e~*ent 
focuses the single system/sub-system/component function failure. 
This may be regarded as a critical event that occurs when th« 
function under consideration transgresses the limits of a pre-
scribed working range dictated by consideration of the fuel 
protection. 
Normally a critical event may be defined as a functional failure 
in a normal operation system/sub-system/component, but in some 
cases also functional failures of certain accident-anticipating/ 
limiting systems may be relevant (example: accidental closure 
of main steam isolation valves in a BWR). 
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b) The symbols used for secondary and input failure modes of a 
functional unit should bring about a thorough examination of 
the possibility of unrecognized causal relations between the 
"hypothesizedly independent" system/sub-system/component 
failures that might cause the postulated critical event. In 
so doing, other critical events may be found (example: loss 
of a certain energy supply may cause simultaneous failure of 
several of the systems under consideration. The loss of this 
energy supply is a critical event, which furthermore perhaps 
also significantly influences other systems/sub-systems/compo-
nents than those hitherto regarded}. 
c) The secondary and input failure mode symbols should help 
particularly to direct the attention towards identification of 
events (causes) that during accident conditions can induce 
catastrophic failure of a system with accident-anticipating/ 
limiting intervention function. The combination of an operation 
system failure and a "blockade" failure of the mentioned kind 
should be treated separately as a critical event. 
3» For each of the critical events a cause/consequence diagram is 
developed. It may sometimes be necessary, however, to treat different 
sub-cases of the critical event in order to obtain consequence 
diagrams with well-defined time delays. (The performance of the 
single accident-anticipating/limiting intervention system has to be 
assessed, and the important question to be answered is: Does the 
system fulfil the basic objectives under the conditions to be met?) 
The criterion is that only those independent faults that may yield 
identical or nearly identical consequences (transient studies may 
show this) are taken into account at the development of the cause/ 
consequence diagram. If all such independent causes of the sub-case 
of the critical event are determined, the "sub-case" itself can be 
regarded as an independent event connected with a probability distri-
bution function. 
In this paper the term "a system oi equipment with accident-antici-
pating/limiting function" has been used instead of the term "an engineered 
eafety system". Normally "an engineered safety system" is defined as a 
safety feature not required for normal operation. In this way a distinc-
tion ia made between safety properties due to design, operation and main-
tenance, and features added to cope specially with accidents* In accordance 
with sound engineering practices an operational and structural separation 
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between normal operation systems and "safety systems" is therefore aimed 
at. However, for a given plant the question of what systems are regarded 
as safety systems arises, and a specification of these might perhaps to 
a great extent restrict the possibilities for selection of critical events. 
In order to meet the demands for safety and production reliability 
(availability) some of the normal operation control systems might in 
certain cases be used for less radical accident-anticipating intervention 
(intervention which for instance gives a certain smaller power reduction 
an by this brings the reactor in a safe state). The term "a system with 
accident-anticipating/limiting function" may include such control systems, 
and the possibility of inclusion of these in a consequence diagram is thus 
kept open. 
k. PROBABILITY ANALTSIS IN CONNECTION VITH DSE OF THE 
CAUSE/CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM METHOD 
The cause/consequence diagram method can be used as a basis for 
probability analysis of large complex systems as well as of small systems. 
For illustration of how a probability analysis say be carried out the 
earlier treated stand-by pump system is chosen as an example* 
The concept a "critical event" is for the sake of illustration used, 
and it is defined as "stop of PI-flow". As accident consequence is 
regarded "total stop of pump flow". In fig. 9 the cause/consequence 
diagram is shown with calculations for determination of the probability 
P(T) that total stop of pump flow will occur at least once during a cer-
tain operating time. T. As seen, the probability distribution function 
P.(t) constitutes the basis from which P(T) is determined. The function 
a 
Pj(t) may be regarded as a distribution function of "demands" where 
demands generally expressed are considered to be those undesired events' 
which call for some immediate or almost immediate action to carry out a 
required protective function. As the cause of the common mode failure, 
loss of the common electric supply for the pumps, has been "extracted" from 
the cause/consequence diagram and shown separately, Pj(t) is given by: 
Pd(t) = P p i ( t W l - PeCt)), 
where Pp*(t) is the distribution function of the failure "stop of PI-flow" 
with the power su;jp^ y in intact condition, and P.(t) is the distribution 
function of the failure "loss of common power supply". 
Two cause diagrams are coupled to the consequence diagram (as the 
cause of the common mode failure has been "extracted", there is no connec-
tion between these and the cause diagram of the "critical event"). One 
cause diagram gives as probability input the distribution function P, (t) 
of the failure "Pi cannot start up" due to unrevealed fail-dangerous 
faults, and the other the distribution function of the failure "stop of 
P2-flow" due to an arisen fault. 
Repair of PI is in fig. 9 not taken into account, but it would be 
very easy to do it. In fig. 10 the diagram is shown for the case of 
repair of PI. It is assumed that change-over to a repaired PI should not 
be carried out unless P2 stops (according to an existing procedure). 
A probability analysis of accidents in a nuclear power plant with 
large complex systems may in principle be carried out in a way similar 
to that in the simple example treated. The cause/consequence diagram 
method provides a basis from which analytical probability calculations 
can be made, but the method should perhaps firet and foremost be regarded 
as a tool by means of which the problems «re defined and presented. The 
use of simple, comprehensible symbols facilitates the communication bet-
ween the "design engineer" and the "statistician" who perhaps later on, 
when the problems have been defined, prefers a "translation" to more 
abstract methods which may be more suitable for computer calculations. 
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